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1、1.everagingDiasporaFinancesforPrivateCapitalMobilizationMigrationandDevelopmentBrief39December20232023InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.SomeRightsReservedThisworkwasproducedundertheGlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopment(KNOMAD).Aglobalhubofknowledgeandpolicye
2、xpertiseonmigrationanddevelopment,KNOMADaimstocreateandsynthesizemultidisciplinaryknowledgeandevidence;generateamenuofpolicyoptionsformigrationpolicymakers;andprovidetechnicalassistanceandcapacitybuildingforpilotprojects,evaluationofpolicies,anddatacollection.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusio
3、nsexpressedinthisworkdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofTheWorldBank,itsBoardofExecutiveDirectors,oritsmembercountries.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorl
4、dBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.NothinghereinshallconstituteorbeconsideredtobealimitationuponorwaiveroftheprivilegesandimmunitiesofTheWorldBank,allofwhicharespecificallyreserved.RightsandPermissionsThisworkisavailableundertheCreativeCommonsAttr
5、ibution3.0IGOlicense(CCBY3.0IGO)http:CreatiVeCommOnSQrgZIiCenSeSby3.0igo.UndertheCreativeCommonsAttributionlicense,youarefreetocopy,distribute,transmit,andadaptthiswork,includingforcommercialpurposes,underthefollowingconditions:Attribution-Pleasecitetheworkasfollows:DilipRatha,VandanaChandra,EungJuK
6、im,SoniaPlaza,andWilliamShaw.2023.“MigrationandDevelopmentBrief39:LeveragingDiasporaFinancesforPrivateCapitalMobilization?*WorldBankzWashington,DC.License:CreativeCommonsAttributionCCBY3.0IGO.Translations-Ifyoucreateatranslationofthiswork,pleaseaddthefollowingdisclaimeralongwiththeattribution:WThiSt
7、ranslationwasnotcreatedbyTheWorldBankandshouldnotbeconsideredanofficialtranslation.TheWorldBankshallnotbeliableforanycontentorerrorinthistranslation/Adaptations-Ifyoucreateanadaptationofthiswork,pleaseaddthefollowingdisclaimeralongwiththeattribution:ThisisanadaptationofanoriginalworkbyTheWorldBank.V
8、iewsandopinionsexpressedintheadaptationarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthororauthorsoftheadaptationandarenotendorsedbyTheWorldBank.”Third-partycontent-TheWorldBankdoesnotnecessarilyowneachcomponentofthecontentcontainedwithinthework.TheWorldBankthereforedoesnotwarrantthattheuseofanythird-party-ownedin
9、dividualcomponentorpartcontainedintheworkwillnotinfringeontherightsofthosethirdparties.Theriskofclaimsresultingfromsuchinfringementrestssolelywithyou.Ifyouwishtoreuseacomponentofthework,itisyourresponsibilitytodeterminewhetherpermissionisneededforthatreuseandtoobtainpermissionfromthecopyrightowner.E
10、xamplesofcomponentscaninclude,butarenotlimitedto,tables,figures,orimages.AllqueriesonrightsandlicensesshouldbeaddressedtoWorldBankPublications,TheWorldBankGroup,1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.KNOMADSchweizerische edgenossenschft ConfederatiOn 而SSe Confederazione S
11、vizzera Confederaziun svzraSwiss Agncy for Development and Cooperation SDCcooperationDtUTSCHtIVUMMtNAMtITImplementedbyI7QMtMUWtMMtIHgWNWZ-IZa-d*1MigrationandDevelopmentBriefsreportupdatesonmigrationandremittanceflowsaswellassalientpolicydevelopmentsintheareaofinternationalmigrationanddevelopment.The
12、GlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopment(KNOMAD)isaglobalhubofknowledgeandpolicyexpertiseonmigrationanddevelopment.Itaimstocreateandsynthesizemultidisciplinaryknowledgeandevidence;generateamenuofpolicyoptionsformigrationpolicymakers;andprovidetechnicalassistanceandcapacitybuildingforpilot
13、projects,evaluationofpolicies,anddatacollection.KNOMADissupportedbyamultidonortrustfundestablishedbytheWorldBank.TheEuropeanCommissionandDeutscheGesellschaftfiirInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ)GmbH,commissionedbyandonbehalfoftheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ),andtheSw
14、issAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC),arethecontributorstothetrustfund.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperdonotrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBankorthesponsoringorganizations.AllqueriesshouldbeaddressedtoKNOMADworldbank.org.KNOMADworkingpapers,policybriefs,andahostofotherresourcesonmigrationareavailableat
15、www.KNOMAD.org.软worldBankgroupContentsAcknowledgmentsVOverviewvi1. TrendsinRemittanceFlows11.1 RemittanceFlowsContinuedtoGrowin2023,albeitataSlowerPacethanin2021-2211.2 ModerateGrowthofRemittancesin202351.3 RemittancesOutlookfor202491.4 RemittanceCosts112. TrendsinGlobalMigrationandRefugeeFlows132.1
16、 GlobalMigration132.2 ImpactsOfTransitMigrationonTransitCountries153. SpecialFocus:LeveragingDiasporaFinancestoMobilizePrivateCapital173.1 NonresidentDeposits173.2 DiasporaBonds193.3 LeveragingRemittancestoImproveCountryCreditworthiness203.4 LeveragingRemittancestoAccessInternationalDebtMarkets22App
17、endixA.RegionalTrendsinMigrationandRemittanceFlows23A.lEastAsiaandPacific23A.2EuropeandCentralAsia28A.3LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean32A.4MiddleEastandNorthAfrica37A.5SouthAsia41A.6Sub-SaharanAfrica45References491.istofFiguresFigure1.1aRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanc
18、eFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,2000-20242Figure 1.1 Remittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,2000-20242Figure 1.2 TopRecipientsofRemittancesamongLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,20235Figure 1.3 EmploymentLevelsofForei
19、gnandNativeBornintheUnitedStates6Figure 1.4 NumberofForeignWorkersinSaudiArabiaIncreasedin2023AReversalofTrend6Figure 1.5 RemittanceFlowsbyLMICRegion,2022-202410Figure 1.6 AverageCostofSendingRemittancesfromG20Countries,2023Q211Figure1.7HowMuchDoesItCosttoSend$200?RegionalRemittanceCosts,2022-2312Fi
20、gure2.1USSouthwestBorderApprehensionsZlnadmissibIeszFY15-FY2314Figure 3.1 RelianceonRemittancesTendstobeGreaterinSub-Investment-GradeCountries17Figure 3.2 ASurgeinNonresidentDepositsinIndia,1997-202319FigureA.lResourceFlowstotheEastAsiaandPacificRegionExcludingChina,2000-202423FigureA.2Top10Remittan
21、ceRecipientsinEastAsiaandPacific,202324FigureA.3RemittanceFlowstothePhilippinesRemainedSteadyin202325FigureA.4CostofSendingMoneyinEastAsiaandPacificRegionRoseSlightlyin2023Q226FigureA.5TheDepreciationoftheRubleagainsttheUSDollarIsAssociatedwithNormalizationofRussianTransfers29FigureA.6ResourceFlowst
22、oEuropeandCentralAsia,2000-202429FigureA.7Top10RemittanceRecipientsinEuropeandCentralAsia,202330FigureA.8RemittanceGrowthinECACountriesDeceleratedin202331FigureA.9CostofSendingMoneyintheECARegionRoseSlightlyin2023Q231FigureA.10ResourceFlowstoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,2000-202433FigureA.llTopRemitt
23、anceRecipientsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,202333FigureA.12EmploymentforHispanicsContinuestobeStrongintheUnitedStates,2008-202334FigureA.13TheCostofSendingMoneytoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanHasRemainedStable35FigureA.14RemittancestoMiddleEastandNorthAfricaOfferSupportagainstHighVolatilityofOtherFlow
24、s,2000202437FigureA.15ResourceFlowstotheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,2000-202438FigureA.16TopRemittanceRecipientsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,202339FigureA.17SendingMoneywithintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaisLessExpensivethanSendingMoneyfromOutside40FigureA.18ResourceFlowstoSouthAsia,2000-202441FigureA.19
25、Top10RemittanceRecipientsinSouthAsia,202342FigureA.20CostofSendingMoneywithinSouthAsiaRemainsLowerin2023Q244FigureA.21ResourceFlowstoSub-SaharanAfrica,2000-202446FigureA.22TopRemittanceRecipientsintheSub-SaharanAfricaRegion,202346FigureA.23CostsofSendingRemittancestoAfricanCountriesVaryWidelyacrossC
26、orridors481.istofTablesTable1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions,2016-20241Table 3.1 NonresidentDepositsaroundtheDevelopingWorld18Table 3.2 ImpactofRemittancesonSovereignRating21TableA.lMigrationStatisticsofMexico361.istofBoxesBox1.1TheInternationalWorkingGrouponI
27、mprovingDataonRemittances(RemitStat)3Box1.2EncouragingRemittanceFlowsthroughFormalChannels7Box1.3GlobalEconomicOutlookin2023and20248AcknowledgmentsThisbriefwaspreparedbyDilipRatha(leadauthor),VandanaChandra,EungJuKim,andWilliamShawoftheSocialProtectionandJobsGlobalPractice,andSoniaPlazaoftheFinance,
28、Competitiveness,andInnovationGlobalPractice.ThankstoIffathSharif,LoliArribas-Banos,andElianaCarranzaforsupportandguidance.CommentsfromAndrewDabalen,IvailoIzvorski,HeidiKaila,WoubetKassazMichaelLokshin,WilliamMaloney,AadityaMattoo,andMarcelaMelendezaregratefullyacknowledged.ThankstoMinCaoandEnricoCam
29、posforexcellentresearchassistance.ThecontributionsofRebeccaOngandSwatiMishraforcommunicationssupport,andFayreMakeigforeditingthereportareespeciallyrecognized.OverviewThegrowthofremittancestolow-andmiddle-incomecountries(LMICs)slowedto3.8percentin2023afteraveragingabout9percentovertheprevioustwoyears
30、.The$669billioninremittancestoLMICsexceedstheforecastgiveninMigrationandDevelopmentBrief38(publishedinJune2023),supportedbythecontinuedstrengthofjobmarketsinthecountriesoftheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),andtheGulfCooperationCouncil.Thegrowthofremittancesin2023wasparticular
31、lyhighinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(8percent)becauseofahistoricallylowrateofemploymentintheUnitedStates,andinSouthAsia(7.2percent),largelyduetoacontinuedincreaseinremittancestoIndia.Remittanceszgrowthin2023wasmoremoderateinEastAsiaandthePacific(3.0percent),althoughexcludingChinagrowthwas7percent,and
32、inSub-SaharanAfrica(1.9percent),thesamerateofincreaseasNigeria,theregionslargestrecipientofremittances.Afterthehuge,likelyone-timemoneytransfersfromtheRussianFederationtoEuropeandCentralAsiain2022,remittancestothatregiondeclinedby1.4percentin2023;theflowsintheregionwereimpactedbymovementofoilpricesa
33、ndinparticular,aweakeningoftherubleagainsttheUSdollar.Remittancesfellby5.3percentintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,inpartbecauselargedifferencesbetweentheofficialandparallelexchangerateinsomecountriesencouragedthediversionofflowstounofficialchannels.RemittanceshavebecomethepremiersourceoffinanceforLMICs
34、,exceedingthemorevolatileforeigndirectinvestmentflowsin2023bymorethan$250billion.Thegrowingimportanceofremittanceshasspurredeffortstoimprovethetimelinessandconsistencyofdataonremittancesflows,themaingoaloftheInternationalWorkingGrouponImprovingDataonRemittances(RemitStat).Thegrowthofremittanceflowst
35、oLMICsisexpectedtoslowto2.4percentin2024,mostlyreflectingaslowingofeconomicgrowthinseveralhigh-incomecountries.Asin2023,remittances/growthisprojectedtobemostrapidinSouthAsia(4.9percent),althoughgrowthwillbemuchslowerthanin2023,andLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(4.4percent),inpartduetotransferstotransitm
36、igrantspassingthroughMexico.ThegrowthofremittancesisexpectedtoturnpositiveintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(2.1percent),inpartduetorecoveryofflowstoEgypt,andtoimproveslightlyinSub-SaharanAfrica(2.5percent),buttoslowdowninEastAsiaandthePacificexcludingChina(5percent)anddipbelowzeroinEuropeandCentralAsia,
37、asflowstotheregionfromRussiacontinuetodecline.Theriskstothisforecastaretiltedtothedownside,giventhepotentialforafurtherdeteriorationinthewarinUkraineandtheconflictintheMiddleEast,increasedvolatilityinoilpricesandcurrencyexchangerates,andadeeper-than-expectedeconomicdownturninmajorhigh-incomecountrie
38、s.Thecostofsendingremittancestodevelopingregionsremainedhighinthesecondquarterof2023,at6.2percentmorethantwicetheSustainableDevelopmentGoaltargetof3percentby2030.AveragecostsremainedthehighestinSub-SaharanAfrica(7.9percent)andthelowestinSouthAsia(4.3percent).OnlytwooftheG20(GroupofTwenty)countries(t
39、heRepublicofKoreaandSaudiArabia)mettheG20goalofreducingremittancecoststo5percent.Thenumberofnew,permanentimmigrantstotheOECDcountriesroseby26percentin2022,withsubstantialincreasesintemporarymigrationaswell(OECD2023).PreliminaryindicationsarethatmigrationtotheOECDcountriesremainedstronginearly2023zdr
40、ivenbyarecoveryinemployment,particularlyintheUnitedStates,wheretheforeign-bornemploymentratehasexceededthatofthenative-bornrate.ThenumberofasylumseekersandirregularbordercrossingsinEuropealsoappeartohaveincreasedin2023.Therapidincreaseinmigrationcomesinthefaceoftherecentadoptionofpoliciestorestricti
41、mmigrationinbothrichandpoorcountries.Examplesincludechargingfeesforentryortransit,imposingvariousrestrictionsonprogramsthatprovidefortheentryofskilledmigrantsorfamilymembers,placingimpedimentsinthewayofasylumseekers,anddeportingundocumentedmigrantsenmasse.Thisbriefsspecialsectiondescribeshowdiaspora
42、financescanbemobilizedfordevelopmentandstrengtheningacountry/sdebtposition.Diasporabondscanbestructuredtodirectlytapdiasporasavingsheldinforeigndestinations.Diasporabondsaregenerallyinsmalldenominationsandtypicallyatalowerinterestratethanissuancestointernationalinvestors.Whileinsomecountriestheamoun
43、toffundsraisedthroughdiasporabondshasbeendisappointing,thesebondshavebeenquitesuccessfulinothers.Problemshaveinvolvedpoliticaloppositionbydiasporamembers,issuanceoflocalcurrencybondswithexchangeraterisk,failuretoregisterbondsincountrieswherethemajorityofoverseasemigrantsIive7andinappropriatefinancia
44、lstructures.Manycountriesprovidefornonresidentdepositstoattractforeign-currency-denominateddiasporasavings.Suchdepositscanbelarge.Forexample,Indiahashadanonresidentdepositprogramforthepastfewdecades,withtotaldepositsequaling$143billioninSeptember2023.However,unlikediasporabonds,suchsavingstendtobesh
45、orttermandvolatile,andarethereforenotappropriatetoolsforfinancinglong-termdevelopmentprojects.Futureinflowsofremittancescanbeusedascollateraltolowerthecostsofinternationalborrowingfornationalbanksindevelopingcountries.Remittancesalsocanplayanimportantroleinimprovingacountrysabilitytorepaydebt,duetot
46、heirlargesizerelativetoothersourcesofforeignexchange,countercyclicalnature,andindirectcontributiontopublicfinances(e.g.zbyincreasingrevenuesfromconsumptiontaxes,aswellasseignioragerevenuesasremittancesaredepositedinthebankingsystem).Thecontributionofremittancestodebtsustainabilityinlow-incomecountri
47、eswasrecognizedinthe2017revisiontotheInternationalMonetaryFund/WorldBankdebtsustainabilityanalysisframework.Thischangewasassociatedwithasignificantimprovementintheevaluationofdebtsustainabilityinsomecountrieswithlargeremittanceinflows.Similarly,econometricresultsshowthattheinclusionofremittancesinth
48、edenominatorofthedebt-to-exportratioinmiddle-incomecountrieswithlargeremittancereceiptswouldimprovethesovereignratingbyonenotch.1. TrendsinRemittanceFlows1.1 RemittanceFlowsContinuedtoGrowin2023,albeitataSlowerPacethanin2021-22Remittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-incomecountries(LMICs)increasedbyanestimated3.8percenttoreach$669billionin2023.Thisrepresentsaslowdowningrowthafterthesharpincreasesin2021-22.Theremittancegrowthrateisprojectedtomoderatefurtherto3.1percentin2024zresultingintotalinflowsof$690billion(table1.1).Remittanceflowstohigh-incomecountrieshaveshown
