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1、中文4890字本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目TheCoreComPetenCeOftheCOnX）ration外文出处HarVardBUSineSSReVieWMay-June1990外文作者普拉哈拉德原文：TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporationThemostpowerfulwaytoprevailinglobalcompetitionisstillinvisibletomanycompanies.Duringthe1980s,topexecutiveswerejudgedontheirabilitytorestructure,declutter,anddel
2、ayertheircorporations.Inthe1990s,theyllbejudgedontheirabilitytoidentify,cultivate,andexploitthecorecompetenciesthatmakegrowthpossibleindeed,theyllhavetorethinktheconceptofthecorporationitself.ConsiderthelasttenyearsofGTEandNEC.Intheearly1980s,GTEwaswellpositionedtobecomeamajorplayerintheevolvinginfo
3、rmationtechnologyindustry.Itwasactiveintelecommunications.Itsoperationsspannedavarietyofbusinessesincludingtelephones,switchingandtransmissionsystems,digitalPABX,semiconductors,packetswitching,satellites,defensesystems,andlightingproducts.AndGTEsEntertainmentProductsGroup,whichproducedSylvaniacolorT
4、Vs,hadapositioninrelateddisplaytechnologies.In1980,GTE,ssaleswere$9.98billion,andnetcashflowwas$1.73billion.NEC,incontrast,wasmuchsmaller,at$3.8billioninsales.Ithadacomparabletechnologicalbaseandcomputerbusinesses,butithadnoexperienceasanoperatingtelecommunicationscompany.YetlookatthepositionsofGTEa
5、ndNECin1988.GTE,s1988saleswere$16.46billion,andNEC,ssaleswereconsiderablyhigherat$21.89billion.GTEhas,ineffect,becomeatelephoneoperatingcompanywithapositionindefenseandlightingproducts.GTE,sotherbusinessesaresmallinglobalterms.GTEhasdivestedSylvaniaTVandTelenet,putswitching,transmission,anddigitalPA
6、BXintojointventures,andcloseddownsemiconductors.Asaresult,theinternationalpositionofGTEhaseroded.NonU.S.revenueasapercentoftotalrevenuedroppedfrom20%to15%between1980and1988.NEChasemergedastheworldleaderinsemiconductorsandasafirsttierplayerintelecommunicationsproductsandcomputers.Ithasconsolidatedits
7、positioninmainframecomputers.Ithasmovedbeyondpublicswitchingandtransmissiontoincludesuchlifestyleproductsasmobiletelephones,facsimilemachines,andlaptopcomputersbridgingthegapbetweentelecommunicationsandofficeautomation.NECistheonlycompanyintheworldtobeinthetopfiveinrevenueintelecommunications,semico
8、nductors,andmainframes.Whydidthesetwocompanies,startingwithcomparablebusinessportfolios,performsodifferently?LargelybecauseNECconceivedofitselfintermsofcorecompetencies,andGTEdidnot.RethinkingtheCorporationOnce,thediversifiedcorporationcouldsimplypointitsbusinessunitsatparticularendproductmarketsand
9、admonishthemtobecomeworldleaders.Butwithmarketboundarieschangingevermorequickly,targetsareelusiveandcaptureisatbesttemporary.Afewcompanieshaveproventhemselvesadeptatinventingnewmarkets,quicklyenteringemergingmarkets,anddramaticallyshiftingpatternsofcustomerchoiceinestablishedmarkets.Thesearetheonest
10、oemulate.Thecriticaltaskformanagementistocreateanorganizationcapableofinfusingproductswithirresistiblefunctionalityor,betteryet,creatingproductsthatcustomersneedbuthavenotyetevenimagined)Thisisadeceptivelydifficulttask.Ultimately,itrequiresradicalchangeinthemanagementofmajorcompanies.Itmeans,firstof
11、all,thattopmanagementsofWesterncompaniesmustassumeresponsibilityforcompetitivedecline.Everyoneknowsabouthighinterestrates,Japaneseprotectionism,outdatedantitrustlaws,obstreperousunions,andimpatientinvestors.Whatishardertosee,orhardertoacknowledge,ishowlittleaddedmomentumcompaniesactuallygetfrompolit
12、icalormacroeconomicnrelief.BoththetheoryandpracticeofWesternmanagementhavecreatedadragonourforwardmotion.Itistheprinciplesofmanagementthatareinneedofreform.NECversusGTE,again,isinstructiveandonlyoneofmanysuchcomparativecasesweanalyzedtounderstandthechangingbasisforgloballeadership.Earlyinthe1970s,NE
13、Carticulatedastrategicintenttoexploittheconvergenceofcomputingandcommunications,whatitcalledHC&CSuccess,topmanagementreckoned,wouldhingeonacquiringcompetencies,particularlyinsemiconductors.Managementadoptedanappropriatestrategicarchitecture/summarizedbyC&C,andthencommunicateditsintenttothewholeorgan
14、izationandtheoutsideworldduringthemid1970s.NECconstitutedaC&CCommittee*1oftopmanagerstooverseethedevelopmentofcoreproductsandcorecompetencies.NECputinplacecoordinationgroupsandcommitteesthatcutacrosstheinterestsofindividualbusinesses.Consistentwithitsstrategicarchitecture,NECshiftedenormousresources
15、tostrengthenitspositionincomponentsandcentralprocessors.Byusingcollaborativearrangementstomultiplyinternalresources,NECwasabletoaccumulateabroadarrayofcorecompetencies.NECcarefullyidentifiedthreeinterrelatedstreamsoftechnologicalandmarketevolution.Topmanagementdeterminedthatcomputingwouldevolvefroml
16、argemainframestodistributedprocessing,componentsfromsimpleICstoVLSI,andcommunicationsfrommechanicalcrossbarexchangetocomplexdigitalsystemswenowcallISDN.Asthingsevolvedfurther,NECreasoned,thecomputing,communications,andcomponentsbusinesseswouldsooverlapthatitwouldbeveryhardtodistinguishamongthem,andt
17、hattherewouldbeenormousopportunitiesforanycompanythathadbuiltthecompetenciesneededtoserveallthreemarkets.NECtopmanagementdeterminedthatsemiconductorswouldbethecompanysmostimportantucoreproduct.Itenteredintomyriadstrategicalliancesover100asof1987aimedatbuildingcompetenciesrapidlyandatlowcost.Inmainfr
18、amecomputers,itsmostnotedrelationshipwaswithHoneywellandBull.Almostallthecollaborativearrangementsinthesemiconductorcomponentfieldwereorientedtowardtechnologyaccess.Astheyenteredcollaborativearrangements,NEC,soperatingmanagersunderstoodtherationaleforthesealliancesandthegoalofinternalizingpartnerski
19、lls.NECsdirectorofresearchsummedupitscompetenceacquisitionduringthe1970sand1980sthisway:Fromaninvestmentstandpoint,itwasmuchquickerandcheapertouseforeigntechnology.Therewasntaneedforustodevelopnewideas.”NosuchclarityofstrategicintentandstrategicarchitectureappearedtoexistatGTE.Althoughseniorexecutiv
20、esdiscussedtheimplicationsoftheevolvinginformationtechnologyindustry,nocommonlyacceptedviewofwhichcompetencieswouldberequiredtocompeteinthatindustrywerecommunicatedwidely.Whilesignificantstaffworkwasdonetoidentifykeytechnologies,seniorlinemanagerscontinuedtoactasiftheyweremanagingindependentbusiness
21、units.Decentralizationmadeitdifficulttofocusoncorecompetencies.Instead,individualbusinessesbecameincreasinglydependentonoutsidersforcriticalskills,andcollaborationbecamearoutetostagedexits.Today,withanewmanagementteaminplace,GTEhasrepositioneditselftoapplyitscompetenciestoemergingmarketsintelecommun
22、icationsservices.TheRootsofCompetitiveAdvantageThedistinctionweobservedinthewayNECandGTEconceivedofthemselvesaportfolioofcompetenciesversusaportfolioofbusinesseswasrepeatedacrossmanyindustries.From1980to1988,Canongrewby264%,Hondaby200%.ComparethatwithXeroxandChrysler.AndifWesternmanagerswereonceanxi
23、ousaboutthelowcostandhighqualityofJapaneseimports,theyarenowoverwhelmedbythepaceatwhichJapaneserivalsareinventingnewmarkets,creatingnewproducts,andenhancingthem.Canonhasgivenuspersonalcopiers;Hondahasmovedfrommotorcyclestofourwheeloffroadbuggies.Sonydevelopedthe8mmcamcorder,Yamaha,thedigitalpiano.Ko
24、matsudevelopedanunderwaterremotecontrolledbulldozer,whileCasio,slatestgambitisasmallscreencolorLCDtelevision.Whowouldhaveanticipatedtheevolutionofthesevanguardmarkets?Inmoreestablishedmarkets,theJapanesechallengehasbeenjustasdisquieting.Japanesecompaniesaregeneratingablizzardoffeaturesandfunctionale
25、nhancementsthatbringtechnologicalsophisticationtoeverydayproducts.Japanesecarproducershavebeenpioneeringfourwheelsteering,fourvalve-percylinderengines,incarnavigationsystems,andsophisticatedelectronicenginemanagementsystems.Onthestrengthofitsproductfeatures,Canonisnowaplayerinfacsimiletransmissionma
26、chines,desktoplaserprinters,evensemiconductormanufacturingequipment.Intheshortrun,acompanyscompetitivenessderivesfromtheprice/performanceattributesofcurrentproducts.Butthesurvivorsofthefirstwaveofglobalcompetition,WesternandJapanesealike,areallconvergingonsimilarandformidablestandardsforproductcosta
27、ndqualityminimumhurdlesforcontinuedcompetition,butlessandlessimportantassourcesofdifferentialadvantage.Inthelongrun,competitivenessderivesfromanabilitytobuild,atlowercostandmorespeedilythancompetitors,thecorecompetenciesthatspawnunanticipatedproducts.Therealsourcesofadvantagearetobefoundinmanagement
28、sabilitytoconsolidatecorporatewidetechnologiesandproductionskillsintocompetenciesthatempowerindividualbusinessestoadaptquicklytochangingopportunities.Seniorexecutiveswhoclaimthattheycannotbuildcorecompetencieseitherbecausetheyfeeltheautonomyofbusinessunitsissacrosanctorbecausetheirfeetareheldtothequ
29、arterlybudgetfireshouldthinkagain.TheprobleminmanyWesterncompaniesisnotthattheirseniorexecutivesareanylesscapablethanthoseinJapannorthatJapanesecompaniespossessgreatertechnicalcapabilities.Instead,itistheiradherencetoaconceptofthecorporationthatunnecessarilylimitstheabilityofindividualbusinessestofu
30、llyexploitthedeepreservoiroftechnologicalcapabilitythatmanyAmericanandEuropeancompaniespossess.Thediversifiedcorporationisalargetree.Thetrunkandmorlimbsarecoreproducts,thesmallerbranchesarebusinessunits;theleaves,flowers,andfruitareendproducts.Therootsystemthatprovidesnourishment,sustenance,andstabi
31、lityisthecorecompetence.Youcanmissthestrengthofcompetitorsbylookingonlyattheirendproducts,inthesamewayyoumissthestrengthofatreeifyoulookonlyatitsleaves.(SeethechartCompetencies:TheRootsofCompetitiveness.)Corecompetenciesarethecollectivelearningintheorganization,especiallyhowtocoordinatediverseproduc
32、tionskillsandintegratemultiplestreamsoftechnologies.ConsiderSonyscapacitytominiaturizeorPhilipssopticalmediaexpertise.Thetheoreticalknowledgetoputaradioonachipdoesnotinitselfassureacompanytheskilltoproduceaminiatureradionobiggerthanabusinesscard.Tobringoffthisfeat,Casiomustharmonizeknowhowinminiatur
33、ization,microprocessordesign,materialscience,andultrathinprecisioncasingthesameskillsitappliesinitsminiaturecardcalculators,pocketTVs,anddigitalwatches.Ifcorecompetenceisaboutharmonizingstreamsoftechnology,itisalsoabouttheorganizationofworkandthedeliveryofvalue.AmongSonyscompetenciesisminiaturizatio
34、n.Tobringminiaturizationtoitsproducts,Sonymustensurethattechnologists,engineers,andmarketershaveasharedunderstandingofcustomerneedsandoftechnologicalpossibilities.Theforceofcorecompetenceisfeltasdecisivelyinservicesasinmanufacturing.Citicorpwasaheadofothersinvestinginanoperatingsystemthatalloweditto
35、participateinworldmarkets24hoursaday.Itscompetenceinprovidedthecompanythemeanstodifferentiateitselffrommanyfinancialserviceinstitutions.Corecompetenceiscommunication,involvement,andadeepcommitmenttoworkingacrossorganizationalboundaries.Itinvolvesmanylevelsofpeopleandallfunctions.Worldclassresearchin
36、,forexample,lasersorceramicscantakeplaceincorporatelaboratorieswithouthavinganimpactonanyofthebusinessesofthecompany.Theskillsthattogetherconstitutecorecompetencemustcoalescearoundindividualswhoseeffortsarenotsonarrowlyfocusedthattheycannotrecognizetheopportunitiesforblendingtheirfunctionalexpertise
37、withthoseofothersinnewandinterestingways.Corecompetencedoesnotdiminishwithuse.Unlikephysicalassets,whichdodeteriorateovertime,competenciesareenhancedastheyareappliedandshared.Butcompetenciesstillneedtobenurturedandprotected;knowledgefadesifitisnotused.Competenciesarethegluethatbindsexistingbusinesse
38、s.Theyarealsotheenginefornewbusinessdevelopment.Patternsofdiversificationandmarketentrymaybeguidedbythem,notjustbytheattractivenessofmarkets.Consider3M,scompetencewithstickytape,indreamingupbusinessesasdiverseasPostitnotes,magnetictape,photographicfilm,pressuresensitivetapes,andcoatedabrasives,theco
39、mpanyhasbroughttobearwidelysharedcompetenciesinsubstrates,coatings,andadhesivesanddevisedvariouswaystocombinethem.Indeed,3Mhasinvestedconsistentlyinthem.Whatseemstobeanextremelydiversifiedportfolioofbusinessesbeliesafewsharedcorecompetencies.Incontrast,therearemajorcompaniesthathavehadthepotentialto
40、buildcorecompetenciesbutfailedtodosobecausetopmanagementwasunabletoconceiveofthecompanyasanythingotherthanacollectionofdiscretebusinesses.GEsoldmuchofitsconsumerelectronicsbusinesstoThomsonofFrance,arguingthatitwasbecomingincreasinglydifficulttomaintainitscompetitivenessinthissector.Thatwasundoubted
41、lyso,butitisironicthatitsoldseveralkeybusinessestocompetitorswhowerealreadycompetenceleadersBlack&Deckerinsmallelectricalmotors,andThomson,whichwaseagertobuilditscompetenceinmicroelectronicsandhadlearnedfromtheJapanesethatapositioninconsumerelectronicswasvitaltothischallenge.Managementtrappedinthest
42、rategicbusinessunit(SBU)mindsetalmostinevitablyfindsitsindividualbusinessesdependentonexternalsourcesforcriticalcomponents,suchasmotorsorcompressors.Butthesearenotjustcomponents.Theyarecoreproductsthatcontributetothecompetitivenessofawiderangeofendproducts.Theyarethephysicalembodimentsofcorecompeten
43、cies.Source:HarvedBusinessReviewMay-June1990译文:公司的核心竞争力很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。20世纪80年代，人们评价某个高管有没有才能，主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。然而，进入20世纪90年代后，人们评价高管时，将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(COreCOmPetence,也称核心能力)，为公司的成长找到新的途径。看来，高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。让我们首先以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC*两家公司为例，探讨十年来它们各自的发展轨迹。20世纪80年代初期，信息技术已初显欣欣向
44、荣的景象，GTE凭借自己的地位，极有希望成为该行业的主力军。这家公司在电信业非常活跃，其业务横跨多个领域,包括电话、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PAXB)半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。此外，GTE旗下的娱乐产品集团(EntertainmentproductsGroup),也就是喜万年(SyIvania)彩电的制造者，在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。1980年，GTE的销售额为99.8亿美元，净现金流17.3亿美元。与之相比，NEC当时还只是一个小字辈，销售收入仅为38亿美元。尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务，但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。然
45、而，到了1988年，NEC却后来者居上，销售额达到218.9亿美元，远远高于GTE公司的164.6亿美元。这时，GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营电话业务为主的公司，尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。这家公司的其他业务从全球的角度看已经变得很小。在过去的几年中，GTE公司已经把喜万年电视机和Telenet业务剥离了出去，把交换机、传输设备和数字PABX等产品转交给合资公司生产，而半导体业务则已关张大吉。在这个过程中，GTE公司的国际地位一路下滑。1980到1988年间GTE在美国以外地区的销售收入从过去占总收入的20%降到了15%0相比之下，NEC却一跃成为世界半导体工业的领导者，并且在电
46、信产品和计算机领域也跻身一流企业。它巩固了自己在大型计算机方面的领先地位，还跨出了公用交换和传输领域，把触角伸到了手机、传真机和手提电脑等所谓的生活时尚产品(IifeStyIeProdUCtS)领域，在电信和办公自动化之间架起了桥梁。NEC成为惟一一家在电信、半导体、大型计算机三个领域的全球销售收入均名列前五位的公司。为什么这两家在起步时业务组合基本相近的公司，在几年后的表现却如此悬殊?主要是因为NEC能够从“核心竞争力”的角度考虑企业问题，而GTEZ却没有。对公司的重新思考经营多元化公司曾经是一项很简单的工作，总部只需指示其业务单位把注意力放到某个特定的最终产品市场，并督促它们成为该领域的世
47、界领先者即可。然而，随着市场边界的变化越来越快，目标开始变得飘忽不定，对目标市场的占领顶多只是暂时性的。但也有几家公司属于长袖善舞的一类,它们善于创造新市场,能够快速打入新兴市场并且在业已成熟的市场中大力改变客户的选择模式。这些公司自然成为大家效仿和学习的对象。对于公司的管理层来说，关键任务就是使自己的组织能够在产品中加入令人无法抗拒的功能，或者更高明一些，创造出消费者需要但是还未曾想到过的产品。这项任务的艰巨性超乎我们的想像。最终，只有从根本上改变大型公司的管理才能完成这项任务。首先，西方企业的高层领导需要为竞争力的下降承担责任。人们或许会把竞争力下降归咎于高利率、日本的保护主义、过时的反托
48、位斯法、爱闹事的工会以及缺乏耐性的投资者。但是，另一方面，人们却较难意识到或者羞于承认这样一个事实：政治上或者宏观经济上的“救济”并不会给公司提供多少动力。其实是西方管理的理论和实践在拖我们的后腿，真正需要改革的是我们在管理中遵循的原则。像许多其他的对比案例一样，NEC与GTE之间的比较可以给我们很多启迪。我们旨在通过这些对比分析来了解争夺全球领先地位所依靠的基础发生了什么变化。早在20世纪70年代初期，NEC公司的管理层就清楚地阐明了把计算机与通信技术相融合的战略意图(StrategiCintent),即所谓的“C&C”(computer&Coniniunication,计算机与通信)。NE
49、C公司的领导认为，这一战略成功与否关键在于能否获得必要的核心竞争力，尤其是在半导体领域的核心竞争力。该公司的管理层采纳了一个合适的战略架构(StrategiCarChiteCtUre)，将其简称C&C,然后在70年代中期将其意图传达给了整个组织以及外界人士。NEC公司成立了一个由高层经理组成的“计算机与通信委员会”，以指导核心产品与核心竞争力的开发。此外，NEC还打破了各项业务的利益界限，建立了一些协调小组和协调委员会。按照其战略架构，NEC把大量的资源调配到元件和中央处理器项目上，以加强公司在该领域的地位。它通过相互协作方式使得公司的内部资源成倍增长，借此积累起了多方面的核心竞争力。NEC仔细地辨明了三种相互关联的技术和市场发展潮流。管理层认为，计算技术将从大型主机架构向分布式处理转变，元件将从简单的集成电路(IC)发展为“超大规模集成电路”(VLSD,通信方面则从机械式纵横交换机演化为复杂的数字传输系统，即我们所说的ISDN(综合业务数字网)。随着形势进一步发展，NEC认为，计算、通信和元件业务将逐渐重叠和交织在一起，以至于最后很难将它们区分开来
