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1、美联储理事：货币政策正常化的经验教训导读6月联邦公开市场委员会(FoMC)将联邦基金利率目标提高75个基点。如果数据符合预期，我将支持在7月的会议上采取类似规模的行动。美联储正在“全力以赴”重建价格稳定。除了美联储的紧急贷款计划外，在2020年和2021年期间采取的很多货币政策都是非常规的，这对于未来的决策有很重要的借鉴意义。从2020年3月初开始，为重振受疫情影响的经济，FOMC和美联储采取的措施说明，在严重的压力下，贷款机制、联邦基金利率的大幅削减以及大规模资产购买，对提振经济非常有效。2020年9月和12月，FOMC发布有关提高联邦基金利率的标准和条件，这种指导是短期的。根据我们在全球金
2、融危机(GFC)后政策的积极经验，我们认为使用同样的步骤顺序是合适的：缩减资产购买，直到停止，提高联邦基金利率，然后通过赎回到期证券逐步和被动地缩减资产负债表。我们明确表示，资产购买的缩减必须在利率提升之前完成，以避免资产购买的宽松政策与加息的紧缩政策发生冲突。实施这种方法需要两方面的指导：第一，开始缩减资产购买的时机标准，第二，开始加息的时机标准。而这很大程度上取决于委员会对经济发展的预测，这实际上是非常局限的。经济复苏的速度超乎委员会的预料。纽约联储2021年1月的一份报告显示2023年底才会开启加息进程。如果当初我们能预知目前的状况，是否还会采取同样的举措？一个需要考虑的问题是指导标准是
3、否过于严格？如果标准能够有所放松，委员会将在何时开启加息的决策上更有灵活性。我支持发布指导标准，但在标准的描述上应使用更加考究的语言，以给予委员会足够的灵活性来应对经济金融环境变化。作者I克里斯托弗沃勒，美联储理事ChristopherJ.Waller：LessonslearnedonnormalizingmonetarypolicySpeechbyMrChristopherJ.Waller,MemberoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,atthenMonetaryPolicyataCrossroads,apaneldiscussio
4、nhostedbytheDallasSocietyforComputationalEconomics,Dallas,Texas,18June2022.Thankyou,MeredithandCullumandthankyoutotheSocietyfortheinvitationtospeaktoyoutoday.Thisweek,theFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)tookanothersignificantsteptowardachievingourinflationobjectivebyraisingtheFederalFundsratetargetby
5、75basispoints.Inmyview,andIspeakonlyformyself,ifthedatacomesinasIexpectIwillsupportasimilar-sizedmoveatourJulymeeting.TheFedis,allinonre-establishingpricestability,andpartofthateffortinvolvesunderstandingtheforcesthathaveboostedinflationandalsoexamininghowpolicymakersresponded.Today,Iintendtolookbac
6、konmonetarypolicyin2020and2021,asIhavebeforeinrecentspeeches,butgoabitfurtherandtrytodiscernsomelessonslearned.1InadditiontotheFederalReserve1semergencylendingprograms,themonetarypolicyactionstakenduringthistimeweredeemedextraordinary.Weswiftlyloweredthetargetrangeforthefederalfundsratetoclosetozero
7、-theeffectivelowerbound-andmadeanopen-endedcommitmenttopurchasingsecurities.ItwasonlythesecondtimethattheFedhadtakensuchdramaticsteps.Butthefirsttimefortheseactionswasscarcelyadecadeago,andthereisgoodreasontothinksucharesponsemaynotbeextraordinaryanymore.Structuralchangesintheeconomyhavetendedtolowe
8、rinterestratesandlimittheroomthattheFederalReservewillhavetocutratesduringaslowdown.2Ihopeweneverhaveanothertwoyearslike2020and2021,butbecauseofthelow-interest-rateenvironmentwenowface,Ibelievethateveninatypicalrecessionthereisadecentchancethatwewillbeconsideringpolicydecisionsinthefuturesimilartoth
9、osewemadeoverthepasttwoyears.Becauseofthatlikelihood,itisespeciallyusefultoconsiderthelessonslearned.Let,sstartatthebeginning,whentheUnitedStateswasfacedwiththeeconomicshockfromC0VID-19.OverseveralweeksstartinginearlyMarch2020,theFOMCloweredthetargetrangeforthefederalfundsratetotheeffectivelowerboun
10、dandbeganpurchasingTreasuriesandagencymortgage-backedsecurities(MBS).Meanwhile,theFedestablishednumerousliquidityandcreditmarketfacilities.3Alltheseactionsweretakentosupportliquidityinthefinancialsystemandkeepcreditflowingtohouseholds,businessesandstateandlocalgovernments.Assetpurchaseswereundertake
11、ninresponsetodisruptionsinfinancialmarkets,particularlyinthenormallystableU.S.Treasurymarket.Besidessupportingsmoothmarketfunctioning,assetpurchasesalsoaidedinthetransmissionofmonetarypolicytobroaderfinancialconditions.Financialmarketsstabilizedrelativelyquickly.Overthecourseof2020,theFed,sliquidity
12、andcreditfacilitiessawreduceddemandandmostoftheemergencyprogramsweredecommissionedaroundyearend.PerhapsthemostStraightforwardtakeawayformonetarypolicyisthatintimesofseverestress,lendingfacilities,alongwithsharpcutstothefederalfundsrateandtheintroductionoflarge-scaleassetpurchases,areveryeffectiveinr
13、evivingtheeconomy.Therearesomeotherlessons,Ithink,fromtheexperienceoftighteningmonetarypolicy,aprocesswhichwasputinmotionbytheguidancethattheFOMCissuedin2020abouthowlongitwouldkeepthefederalfundsrateattheeffectivelowerboundandcontinueassetpurchases.InSeptemberandDecemberof2020,theFOMCprovidedcriteri
14、aorconditionsinthemeetingstatementthatwouldneedtobemetbeforetheFOMCwouldconsiderraisinginterestratesandbegintoreduceassetpurchases,respectively.Theseconditionswere,ineffect,theFOMC,splanforstartingtheprocessoftighteningpolicy.Thisguidancewasshortterm,specifictothetaskofwhentotightenpolicyinthiscurre
15、ntcycle,andfocusedonspecifictools.Letmemakeanimportantdistinctionhere.Abitearlier,inAugust2020,theCommitteecompletedamulti-yearreviewofouroverallstrategyforachievingandsustainingoureconomicgoals.Thestrategystatementisverydifferentthanthetighteningguidance-itisaboutlonger-rungoals,notspecificactionsr
16、elatedtothecurrentcircumstances.Thegoalsinthestrategystatementapplyinalleconomiccircumstancesanddon,tincludeanydetailsonthesettingsofpolicytools.ImentionthisdistinctionbecausesomehavearguedthattheFOMC,snewstrategywasafactorthatledtheCommitteetowaittoolongtobegintighteningmonetarypolicy.Abitlater,Iwi
17、llexplainwhyIdonotbelievethisisthecase,andIwillexplainhowtheguidancefortighteningpolicy,laidoutintheFOMC,spost-meetingstatements,wasthebasisforourdecisions.So,let,sthinkabouthowtheeconomyevolvedandhowthecriteriaforthatguidancesteeredthepathofpolicy.Inearly2021,theCommitteebegannotingwhethertheeconom
18、ywasmakingprogresstowardouremploymentandinflationgoals,andthusgettingclosertodecisionsonunwindingourhighlyaccommodativepolicy.BasedonourpositiveexperiencewithunwindingaftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC),wethoughtitwouldbeappropriatetousethesamesequenceofsteps：taperassetpurchasesuntiltheyceased,thenli
19、ftratesofftheeffectivelowerbound,thengraduallyandpassivelyreduceourbalancesheetbyredeemingmaturingsecurities.Mostimportantly,throughvariouscommunications,wemadeitclearthattaperingofassetpurchaseswouldhavetobecompletedbeforerateliftofftoavoidtheconflictthatwouldoccurbyeasingviacontinuingassetpurchase
20、sversustighteningthroughratehikes.Inthepreviousepisodeoftighteningpolicyafterextraordinaryaccommodation,thisprocesswasverygradual.Taperingofassetpurchasestook11months,andthenthefirstratehikedidnotoccuruntilmorethanayearafterpurchasesended.Balancesheetreductionbeganmorethanayearandhalfafterthat.Thisg
21、radualismworkedwellthen,anditsurelyinfluencedtheCommitteersapproachthistime.Implementingthisapproachrequiredtwopiecesofguidance：first,criteriaforbeginningthetaperingprocess,and,second,criteriatobeginraisingthepolicyratefromtheeffectivelowerbound.ThroughexplicitlanguageinFOMCstatements,wetoldthepubli
22、cthenecessaryconditionsthatneededtobemetbeforewewouldadjustthesetwopolicies.Forassetpurchases,theCommitteedeclaredthattaperingwouldwait,untilsubstantialfurtherprogresshasbeenmadetowardtheCommittee,smaximumemploymentandpricestabilitygoals.114Meanwhile,theFOMCsaidthatitwouldkeepratesnearzerountilourem
23、ploymentgoalhadbeenreachedanduntilinflationhadreached2percentandwas,ontracktomoderatelyexceed2percentforsometime.,15Afairquestionis：whatdidthesewordsmean?And,inparticular,whatdidthephrases,substantialfurtherprogress1fortaperingand,forsometime,fforliftoffmean?Inlargeparttheinterpretationhingedonhowth
24、eCommitteeviewedtheeconomywouldrecoverfromthepandemic.LookingacrossforecastsatthetimebyCommitteeparticipantsandtheprivatesector,nooneexpectedsubstantialprogresstowardbothourgoalstohappenverysoon.Theeconomyhadbeguntherecover,butattheendof2020COVIDwasbadandgettingworseandvaccineswerejustarriving,sowed
25、idn,tknowhowsoonschoolswouldreopenandpeoplewouldgetbacktowork.InNovemberandDecember2020,theunemploymentratewas6.7percentandinflationseemedtobeincheck：12-monthpersonalconsumptionexpendituresinflationwasdeclining,andcoreinflation,whichexcludesvolatileenergyandfoodprices,wasmoreorlesssteadyat1.5percent
26、.TheSummaryofEconomicProjectionsbyFOMCparticipantsinDecember2020hadtheunemploymentratemovingdownto4.2percentattheendof2022andinflationmovingupto2percentonlyin2023.Onlyoneparticipanthadliftoffoccurringbytheendof2022.BasedonthisSEP,theCommitteedidnotexpecttheeconomytorecoverquickly.And,lookingattheFed
27、eralReserveBankofNewYork,sSurveyofPrimaryDealersbackinJanuaryof2021,themedianrespondentthoughttaperingwouldstartinthefirstquarterof2022andliftoffwouldn,tbeuntiltheendof2023orlater.Tomoveforward,policymakershadtoevaluate,substantialfurtherprogress,and,forsometime.,Thephrases,admittedly,arenotconcrete
28、intheirmeaning.Inflationaveragingdoesn,tdefinehowmuchabove2percentismoderateandhowlongsomevalueofelevatedinflationshouldbetolerated.Inaddition,forassessingprogressonthehealthofthelabormarket,differentpolicymakerswillpreferdifferentmeasuresthatmaynotprovidetheexactsamesignal.Ontopofthis,thedatausedto
29、measureprogressinthelabormarketcanrevisesubstantiallyandreshapetheevaluationofthestrengthofthismarketquitequickly.Forexample,akeyinput-payrolldata-inthelatterhalfof2021paintedapictureofaslowinglabormarket.Butreviseddataoverseveralsubsequentmonthsrevealedthattheslowdownneverhappened.Instead,jobgainsw
30、erequiterobust.Inparticular,initialreportsofjobcreationbetweenAugustandDecemberwereacumulative1.4million,butbyFebruaryofthisyearthatnumberwasreviseduptonearly2.9million.Overall,theeconomyevolvedrapidlyin2021.Iwon,tgetintothemonth-by-monthdetails,asIhaveinrecentspeeches,butbyOctoberandNovember,policy
31、makersthoughttheeconomyhadimprovedenoughtomeetthecriteriatostarttaperingattheearlyNovembermeeting.Then,laterthatmonth,dataindicatedinflationwasaccelerating,sotheCommitteehastenedthepaceoftaperingattheDecembermeeting,makingaplantowinddownpurchasesbyearlyMarch.BetweenDecemberandMarchofthisyearinflatio
32、ndatacameinveryelevated,andatthatpointtherewasnoquestionthatinflationhadbeenabove2percentfor,sometime.,Givencontinuedimprovementinthelabormarketandthehighinflationreadings,theCommitteebeganraisinginterestratesinMarch,assoonasassetpurchaseswerecompleted.Withtheseactionsintherearviewmirror,wecannowask
33、：knowingwhatweknownow,shouldwehavedoneanythingdifferently?Tobeclear,byaskingthisquestionmyintentisnottocriticizethedecisionsoftheCommittee.Rather,itistoassessourpolicystrategiesshouldwebeconfrontedwithanothercrisisinthefuture.Onequestiontoaskiswhethertheguidanceweissuedwastoorestrictive；inotherwords
34、,diditallowenoughflexibilityfortheFOMCtobeginraisingthepolicyratewhenitwasappropriateto?Recall,wehaddecidedthatraisingthepolicyratewouldnotoccuruntilthetaperingofassetpurchaseshadfinished.Buttofinish,taperingmuststart-foragivenpaceoftapering,thelongerittakestostarttapering,thelongeritwillbebeforethe
35、policyratecanberaised.Ofcourse,onecankeeptheliftoffdatefixedandsimplytaperatamuchfasterrate,includingthepossibilityofahardstopofassetpurchases.Butconcernsaboutfinancialmarketfunctioning,includingtheabilityofmarketstoabsorbthepurchasestheFedstopsmaking,typicallylimitshowfastthetaperingcanbe,particula
36、rlygiventheamountofassetpurchasesweweremakingatthetime($120billionpermonth).Giventhetaperingcriteriaandsubsequentdata,weultimatelyhadtopivothardtoacceleratethetaperingpaceand,infact,completedthetaperingofpurchasesjustafewdaysbeforeweliftedoff.Unlikethenormalizationtimelineafterthefinancialcrisis,wed
37、idnothaveflexibilitytoraisethetargetrangesooner.However,ifwehadlessrestrictivetaperingcriteriaandhadstartedtaperingsooner,theCommitteecouldhavehadmoreflexibilityonwhentobeginraisingrates.6So,byrequiringsubstantialfurtherprogresstowardmaximumemploymenttoevenbegintheprocessoftighteningpolicy,onemighta
38、rguethatitlockedtheCommitteeintoholdingthepolicyrateatthezerolowerboundlongerthanwasoptimal.Mytakeawayisthatalessrestrictivetaperingcriteriawouldhaveallowedmoreflexibilitytotaper,soonerandgradually,asopposedtotherelatively,laterandfaster11approachthatoccurred.Experiencehasshownthatmarketsneedtimetoa
39、djusttoaturnfromaccommodationtotightening,andthatsurelywasafactorforFOMCstatementsovertheyearsinframingcriteriaforkeypolicyactionsduringtherecoveryfromtheGFCandthepandemic.So,I,msupportiveofissuingsuchcriteriabutweneedtobecarefultouselanguagethatallowstheCommitteetheflexibilityitneedstorespondtochan
40、gingeconomicandfinancialconditions.Nowlet,sturntotheliftoffcriteria.Itwasalsoquiterestrictive.Theliftoffcriteriarequiredtheeconomytobeinasituationwhereourdualmandatehadbeenachieved.Itcanbearguedthatthismeantgettingtheeconomybacktoits2019statewithverylowunemploymentandinflationnear2percent.Butthepoli
41、cyratein2019waswellabovezeroandclosetoitsneutralvalue.Consequently,ifthestateoftheeconomyistellingyoutobeatneutralandyouareatzero,thenanyTaylorrulewouldsaythepolicyrateneedstorisemuchfasterthanwastypicallydoneinthepast.So,itshouldnothavebeenasurprisethatthepolicyratewouldrisefastin2022.Ratehikeswoul
42、dneedtobelargerandmorefrequent,relativetothe2015-2018tighteningpace,togetbacktoneutral.Lookingback,shouldtheCommitteehavesignaledasteeperratepathoncetheliftoffcriteriahadbeenmet?Perhapsanotherlessonisthatgivingforwardguidanceaboutliftoffshouldalsoincludeforwardguidanceaboutthepossiblepathofthepolicy
43、rateafterliftoff.Inclosing,IhopethatourcountryisnotfacedwithanothercrisisassevereastheoneprecipitatedbyCOVID,andthattheFedisnotfacedwiththechallengesofsettingmonetarypolicyundersuchconditions.Butifweagainfacethosechallenges,wenowhavetheadditionalinsightthatonlyexperiencecanbring.Ihopethatthislateste
44、xperiencewillhelpusapproachthefuturewithamorecompleteunderstandingofthepolicychoicesandtradeoffs.1. SeeChristopherJ.Waller(2022),ReflectionsonMonetaryPolicyin2021,speechdeliveredatthe2022HooverInstitutionMonetaryConference,Stanford,California,May6；andChristopherJ.Waller(2021),AHopelessandImperativeE
45、ndeavor：LessonsfromthePandemicforEconomicForecasters,speechdeliveredattheForecastersClubofNewYork,NewYork,December17.TheseremarksrepresentmyownviewsandnotanypositionoftheFederalReserveBoardortheFederalOpenMarketCommittee.2. Researchhassuggestedalargenumberofdevelopmentsmayhavecontributedtoadeclinein
46、theequilibriumrealinterestrate,focusingonfactorsthatmayhaveshiftedaggregatesavingsand/orinvestmentinamannerthatdepressestherealinterestraterequiredtoequilibratesavingsandinvestment.Forexample,lowertrendeconomicgrowthlikelylowersaggregateinvestment,whiledemographicfactorssuchasanincreaseinlifeexpecta
47、ncymayincreasesavings.Otherresearchhasemphasizedanincreaseindemandforsafeassetsamongemergingmarketeconomies,whichdepressesinterestratesinadvancedeconomies.Forareviewandreferences,seeMichaelKiley(2020),TheGlobalEquilibriumRealInterestRate：Concepts,Estimates,andChallenges,AnnualReviewofFinancialEconom
48、ics,vol.12(1),pp.305-26.3. SupportedbyfundsprovidedbytheCARESAct,theFederalReservecreated,withtheauthorizationoftheU.S.TreasuryDepartment,anumberofemergencylendingfacilities.Theextraordinary,dashforcash,earlyinthepandemicthreatenedtheorderlyfunctioningofmoneymarketsaswellastheflowofcredittoemployers
49、.TheBoardrespondedwithasetofemergencylendingfacilitiesthat,collectivelysupportedtheflowofcreditthroughouttheeconomybothbyprovidingbackstopsand,insomecases,bymoredirectlysupplyingfunding.Futuredownturnsareunlikelytoseethesameglobal,sharp,andintensedemandforliquidity,andthusnotwarrantthesamekindofemergencylending.FormoredetailsontheFed,sfacilitiestosupporthouseholds,businesses,andmunicipalitiesduringtheCOVIDcrisisseetheNovember2020FinancialStabilityReport.4. SeeBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSy
