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1、November 2021Contributing authors:Kristine Berzina, Ivo Juurvee5Tony Lawrence and Maurice TurnerJOINTAjoined-upUnion,astrongerEuropeJOINTResearchPapersNo.4NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssetsKristiRaikThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnionsHorizon20
2、20researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementN.959143.Thispublicationreflectsonlytheviewoftheauthor(s)andtheEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssetsLeadauthor:KristiRaikContri
3、butingauthors:KristineBerzina,IvoJuurvee,TonyLawrenceandMauriceTurner*AbstractInthepastdecades,theEUhasdevelopedanincreasinglybroad,multi-sectoralsetofforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments.AllofthesecanberelevantinsustainingtheEU,scrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Whiletryingtocreateamoreeffectiveand
4、integratedtoolbox,theUnionhasfacedanumberofchallenges.First,astheEU,sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthentheuharderend”ofinstruments-includingmilitary,cyberandintelligencetools-hasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweak.Second,withEUpoliciesextendingtoareaswheretheUni
5、on,sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstates1resourceshasbecomemoreimportant,butensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstateshasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoeachothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.KristiRaikisDirectoroftheEsto
6、nianForeignPolicyInstituteattheInternationalCentreforDefenceandSecurity(ICDS).KristineBerzinaisSeniorFellowandHeadoftheGeopoliticsTeamattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates(GMF).IvoJuurveeisHeadofSecurity&ResilienceProgrammeattheICDS.TonyLawrenceisHeadofDefencePoli
7、cyandStrategyProgrammeattheICDS.MauriceTurnerisCybersecurityFellowattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGMF.TheauthorsaregratefultoStevenBlockmans,ZachPaikinandDylanMacchiariniCrossonfromCEPSandPolBargudsfromCIDOBfortheirthoroughandinsightfulcommentsonearlierversionsofthepaper.IntroductionThefirstfo
8、reignpolicytoolsoftheEuropeanUniondatebacktothecreationoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1957,whichestablishedcommonexternaleconomicpolicieswithastrongsupranationalcompetence.Thiswastraditionallyseenasthetechnical,hIowpoliticsnareaofexternalrelations,asopposedtothe“highpolitics*ofsensitiveforeignandse
9、curitypolicymatterswherememberstateswerekeentomaintainanintergovernmentalapproach.1Foreignpolicycoordinationamongmemberstatesincreasedfromthe1970s,butaleaptoamoreinstitutionalised-yetstillintergovernmental-CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)wasonlymadewiththeMaastrichtTreatysignedin1992.Thenewmomen
10、tumwasinitiatedbydramaticchangesintheinternationalenvironmentthatcreatedbothnewspaceandaneedforastrongerEuropeanapproachtoregionalsecuritymatters,whichwasmostpainfullyunderscoredbythewarsinformerYugoslavia.Sincethe1990s,theUnionhasbeengraduallystrengtheningthe“higher Stanley Hoffmann, ,The European
11、Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes,l in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1964), p. 85-101. Josep Borrell Fontelles, Opening statement, Hearing at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 7 October 2019, https:/multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/ hearing-of-
12、josep-borrell- fontelles-high-representative-vice-president-designate-of-the-european-commission-opening-statement_l 178140-V_v.and*,hardernendofEUforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments,therebybecominganincreasinglymultisectoralforeignpolicyactor.Duringthepastdecade,thechanginginternationalenvironmenth
13、asyetagaincreatednewdemands,astheworldhasbecomemoremultipolar,uncertaintyabouttheUnitedStates*commitmenttoEuropeansecurityhasgrown,instabilityintheEU,simmediateneighbourhoodhasincreased,andsecurityrisksandthreatshavebecomemorecomplexandmanifold.InthewordsofHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsa
14、ndSecurityPolicyJosepBorrell,thishascreatedtheneedfortheEUto,learntousethelanguageofPoWer2-whichimpliesthenecessitytodevelopitsforeignpolicytoolsaccordingly.TheEUhasmadeeffortstostrengthenitsmilitarycapabilitiesintheframeworkoftheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)launchedin1999,whileadditionaltool
15、shavebeencreatedtoaddressnewthreatsinareassuchascybersecurityanddisinformation.TheEUhasthusconstructedanincreasinglycomplextoolboxcomposedofnumerouscompartmentsgovernedbydifferentinstitutionalarrangementsanddecision-makingprocedures,wherebytheEUforeignandsecuritypolicy(EUFSP)hasexpandedbeyondtherela
16、tivelylimiteddiplomatic-militaryremitoftheCFSP/CSDP.Howtomobilisethedifferentinstrumentsandapplytheminaconcertedmannerhasbecomeanincreasinglypressingandcomplicatedquestiontoanswer.ThisreportaimstounpackthiscomplexitybyexploringhowandwhyEUFSPhasbecomemoremulti-sectoraloverthepastdecades.Itfocusesonpo
17、licytoolsthatsustainEUcrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Followingtheintroduction,thesecondpartofthereportanalysestheinternalandexternalfactorsthathaveshapedthedevelopmentofamoremulti-sectoralEUFSPandthenprovidesanoverviewandassessmentoftwokeyareas:diplomacyandcrisismanagement.Thethirdpartwilltakeac
18、loserlookataselectionofmorerecentanddynamicinstrumentsinthreefields:military,cybersecurityandintelligencecapabilities,whichareallvitalfortheEU,sabilitytomanagecontemporaryconflictsandcrises.Finally,thereportdrawsconclusionsonthesuccessesandfailuresofamulti-sectoralapproach,highlightingthreechallenge
19、sidentifiedwhileanalysingtheevolutionoftheinstruments.First,astheEU,sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthenthe,harderendofinstrumentshasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweakcomparedtotheEU,ssoft,civilian/non-coercivetools.Second,duetogrowing“multi-sectornessextendingt
20、oareaswheretheEU,sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstatesresourcesandcooperateandcoordinatewithotheractorshasbecomemoreimportantbutensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstatesinparticularhasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoea
21、chothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.1. Conceptualisation,overviewandassessmentoftheincreasinglymulti-sectoralEUFSP1.1 Internalandexternalpressuretowardsgrowingmulti-sectornessThegrowingmulti-sectornessofEUFSPduringthepastdecadescanbeexplainedbyaninterplayofinternalandexternalfactors.Internally,deepen
22、ingintegrationhasbroughtnewpolicyareastotheEU,sagendaandgraduallyextendedEllcompetenciesinareastraditionallybelongingtotherealmofnationalsovereignty.Sincethe1950s,thisprocesshasattimesaccelerated,andattimesstoodstill,butoverall,onecanarguethattherehasbeenafunctionalistlogicofintegrationextendingfrom
23、onesectortoanother,withspill-overeffectstriggeringfurthercooperation.Forexample,economicandtradeintegrationhadimplicationsformemberstates1relationswiththirdcountries,contributingtoclosercoordinationoftheirforeignandsecuritypolicies.Ithasalsobeenarguedthatforeignpolicyintegrationhasfollowedthelogicof
24、internalfunctionalityinthesenseofbeingavehicleforfurtherevolutionoftheEuropeanprojectsWhiletheinternallogicoffunctionalityhaspushedintegrationforward,theprinciplesofintergovernmentalismandnationalsovereigntyhaveremainedstrongintherealmofforeignandsecuritypolicy,whichisvisibleinthedevelopmentofEUFSPi
25、nstruments.EveninthemostintegratedaspectoftheEU,sexternalrelations,trade,thegrowingcomplexityandstrongerpoliticalaspectsoftradeagreementshavemadeitmoredifficulttogaintheapprovalofallmemberstatesfornewdeals.Inthefieldofdiplomacy,foreignpolicyintegrationhasnotreducedmemberstates*investmentintheirowndi
26、plomatictools(e.g.diplomaticstaffandnetworksofembassies)whichinthecaseoflargermemberstatesisfarlargerthantheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)thatcomprisesthediplomaticarmoftheEUmEUforeignpolicycanbeseentoentailboththepoliciesinstitutionalisedattheEUlevelandnationalforeignpolicies,althoughinpractic
27、ememberstates*actionsarenotalwaysalignedwithwhathasbeencommonlyagreedattheEUlevel.NationalinstrumentscanbeappliedtothebenefitoftheEUasawhole,forexample,withmemberstatesallocatingpartoftheirdevelopmentcooperationfundsthroughtheEU.Furthermore,onsomeoccasions,nationalforeignministershaveconductednegoti
28、ationswiththirdcountriesonbehalfoftheUnion.However,thereisavastunusedpotentialinactuallymakingmemberstates*foreignpolicyinstrumentsavailabletotheEUandusingthemtoimplementjointlyagreedEUpolicies.ChristopherJ.Bickerton,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy:FromEffectivenesstoFunctionality,Basingstoke,PalgraveMac
29、millan,2011.4 RosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik,“Conclusions:AdaptationtotheEUortotheChangingGlobalContext?*,inRosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik(eds),TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceandNationalForeignMinistries.ConvergenceorDivergence?,Farnham,Ashgate52015,p.197.Thetensionbetweensupranatio
30、nalandintergovernmentalelementsofEUFSP,andpossiblewaystomovebeyondthedichotomy,hasbeenextensivelycoveredinearlierstudies.5However,thedichotomyremainsvisibleinthedifferentinstitutionalstructuresandpolicy-makingproceduresindifferentareasofEUFSP.Theinstitutionalandproceduralcomplexityisanimportantfeatu
31、reofthemulti-sectornessofEUFSPthatreducesitsconsistencyandeffectiveness.NewmeasurestoimproveconsistencyandcoordinationhavebeenintroducedwithtreatychangessinceMaastricht,especiallywiththeLisbonTreatythatcreatedtheEuropeanExternalActionServicesYetcoordinationamonginstitutions,notablytheEEASandtheCommi
32、ssion,andbetweentheEUandnationalinstitutionsremainedamajorchallenge.7Externally,thechanginginternationalenvironmenthascreatednewdemandsandopportunitiesforastrongerEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Inthe1970s,Europeanforeignpolicycoordinationwasenhancedintheshadowofbipolarcompetitionbetweenthetwosuperpowers
33、ofthetime,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Quiteliketoday,Europeans-especiallytheFrench-weremotivatedtopursueamoreindependentforeignpolicythatwasnotalwaysinagreementwiththeUnitedStates(withvisibletensionsinthetransatlanticrelationshipoverissuessuchastheMiddleEast,AfghanistanandPoland).8Thecollapseof
34、theEasternblocandtheendoftheColdWarcreatedanentirelynewexternalenvironmentwheretheEUandtheUnitedStatesagreedonthestrategicgoalstoreunifyEuropeandextendliberaldemocracyandmarketeconomytotheformerEasternbloc,whiletheEUhadanindispensableroletoplay5 E.g.,ibid.;JosepBatora,*The1MitraiIIeuseEffect:TheEEAS
35、asanInterstitialOrganizationandtheDynamicsofInnovationinDiplomacy,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.51,No.4(July2013),p.598-613;JolyonHoworth1,Decision-MakinginSecurityandDefensePolicy:TowardsSupranationalInter-Governmentalism?,inCooperationandConflict,Vol.47,No.4(December2012),p.433-453.6 Jean-Cla
36、udePiris,TheLisbonTreaty:ALegalandPoliticalAnalysis,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010.7 ChristopheHillionandStevenBlockmans,FromSelf-DoubttoSelf-Assurance.TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceastheIndispensableSupportforaGeopoliticalEU,Brussels,CEPSSIEPSFES,January2021,https:/www.sieps.se/en/public
37、ations/2021/from-self-doubt-to-self-assurance.OHazelSmith,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy.WhatItIsandWhatItDoes,LondonZSterIing,PlutoPress,2002,p.127-135.inpursuingthesegoals.Atthesametime,thewarsinformerYugoslaviaandthefragilesecuritysituationinmanyotherpartsoftheformerEasternbloccalledforastrongerEUcon
38、tributiontoEuropeansecuritybeyondtheUnion,sborders.ThisnewcontextcontributedtotheestablishmentoftheCFSPandtheemergenceofenlargementasamajor,aswellasdistinctlymulti-sectoral,foreignpolicytoolfocusedonsecuringdemocracy,stabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinEurope.Thenewpost-ColdWarenvironmentalsoexplainsth
39、eriseofcrisismanagementasamajorpriorityofCSDP5withthefirstmissionslocatedintheWesternBalkans.Furthermore,thespecificshapeofEUcrisismanagement,withafocusonciviliantoolsandlong-terminvolvementinpost-conflictreconstruction,reflectsboththeinternalnatureoftheEUandthebroaderinternationaltrendsatthetime.Th
40、eEU,sinternalhistoricalexperienceofsecuringpeacethroughintegrationhasbeenreflectedintheemphasisputontheinstitution-buildingandintegrationoftheWesternBalkancountriesintotheUnion.Externally,theendofColdWarconfrontationsreducedtherelevanceofmilitarypower,inspiteoftheYugoslavwarshappeningrightnextdooran
41、dunderscoringtheEU,sinabilitytopreventthefightingortointervene.AlthoughwarwasstillarealityinonecornerofEurope,inalonger-termperspectivethefutureofEuropeansecuritydependedtoalargeextentonthesuccessofpoliticalandeconomictransformationinpost-Communistcountriesandbeyond,whichhighlightedtheneedforabroade
42、rsetoftools.Internally,theEUbuiltitsforeignpolicyidentitystronglyonthenotionsofcivilianandnormativepower(thelatternotexcludingtheuseofmilitaryinstruments,butnonethelessstressinganon-militaryapproach).Inanattempttoturnthelackofmilitarycapabilitiesintoavirtue-orreflectingaconvictionthatacivilianapproa
43、chwasindeedtheEU,sparticularstrengthandadvantage-theEU(andahostofEUFSPresearch)emphasisedtheuniquenatureofitsinternationalactorness.9Sincethemid-2000s,theEuropeanandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthasbecomemoreconflictual,complexandunpredictable.ThisisevidentinthecontrastbetweentheEuropeanSecuritySt
44、rategyof2003andtheEUGlobalStrategyof9 E.g.,FranoisDuchene,*4TheEuropeanCommunityandtheUncertaintiesoflnterdependence,inMaxKohnstammandWolfgangHager(eds),ANationWritLarge?Foreign-PolicyProblemsbeforetheEuropeanCommunity,LondonZBasingstoke,PalgraveMaCm川an,1973,p.1-21;IanManners,NormativePowerEurope:AC
45、ontradictioninTerms?,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.40,No.2(June2002),p.235-258.2016.WhiletheprioritiesofEUFSPremainedlargelythesame,thelatterpointstoahostofnewchallenges,highlightingtheneedtowenhanceoureffortsondefence,cyber,counterterrorism,energyandstrategicCornrnUniCationSZoThestrategyalsoca
46、llsforstrongerintelligencecapabilitiestoachievebetterandsharedassessmentsofinternalandexternalthreatsandchallenges,.nTheseinstrumentsarepartofan“integratedapproachtoconflictsandcrises-aconceptintroducedbytheGlobalStrategy,buildingonearliereffortstodevelopa“comprehensiveapproach.Theneedtostrengthenth
47、eharderendofEUFSPinstrumentshasbeendictatedbyexternalfactors,whiletheEU,sreadinesstomoveaheadhasbeenweakenedbyinternalpoliticalfactorssuchaslackofacommonstrategiccultureandsharedthreatperceptions.Arguablytoday,whiletheregionalandglobalsecurityenvironmentmakesstrengtheningEUFSPmorenecessarythanever,s
48、trongerinternalcohesionismoredifficulttoachieve.1 .2AssessingtheevolutionofEUdiplomacyandcrisismanagementAsnotedabove,theEU,sdiplomatictoolsmadealeapforwardwiththeMaastrichtTreatythatestablishedtheCFSP.ThecreationoftheinstitutionsoftheHighRepresentative(HR)forCFSP(1999),apostlatermergedwiththatofthe
49、ExternalActionCommissionerintoanempoweredHighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyandVice-PresidentoftheCommission(HRVP)(2009),andtheEEAS(alsoin2009)strengthenedtheEU,sdiplomaticcapacity.YettheUnion,sachievementsinmanagingconflictsandcriseshavebeenmodest.Weakpoliticalunity,institutionalcohesionandpolicyinstruments,includinghardpowertobackupsofttools,arefrequentlycitedreasonsforthelimitedsuccess.Abrieflookatfourdifferentcases-thewarsinex-Yugo
