《布鲁盖尔研究所-战略外交经济政策的工具（英）-2021.11-131正式版.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《布鲁盖尔研究所-战略外交经济政策的工具（英）-2021.11-131正式版.docx（123页珍藏版）》请在课桌文档上搜索。
1、KIELINSTITTheworldeconomyDIWBERLINAssociationbruegelStudybyIfWKiel5BruegelandDIWBerlinInstrumentsofaStrategicForeignEconomicPolicyStudyfortheGermanFederalForeignOfficeKatrinKamin,KerstinBernoth,JacquelineDombrowski,GabrielFelbermayr,MarcelFratzscher,MiaHoffmann,SebastianHorn,KarstenNeuhoff5NiclasFre
2、dericPoitiers,MalteRieth,AlexanderSandkamp5PaulineWeiljGuntramWolff,GeorgZachmannInstrumentsofaStrategicForeignEconomicPolicyStudyfortheGermanFederalForeignOfficeLeadautho匚Dr.KatrinKamin(IfWKiel)Contributingauthors:Dr.KerstinBernoth(DIW)Prof.Dr.GabrielFelbermayr(IfWKiel)Prof.Dr.MarcelFratzscher(DIW)
3、MiaHoffmann(Bruegel)Dr.NiclasFredericPoitiers(Bruegel)Dr.MalteRieth(DIW)PaulineWeil(Bruegel)Dr.GuntramWolff(Bruegel)Dr.GeorgZachmann(Bruegel)Assistingauthors:JacquelineDombrowski(IfWKiel)Dr.SebastianHorn(IfWKiel)Prof.Dr.KarstenNeuhoff(DIW)Prof.Dr.AlexanderSandkamp(IfWKiel)AstudybyKielInstituteforthe
4、WorldEconomy(IfW)KIEL INSTITTHE WORLD ECONOMYGermanInstituteforEconomicResearch(DlWBerlin)DIWBERLINBruegelbruegelTheKielInstitutefortheWorldEconomy,DIWBerlinandBruegelthanktheGermanFederalForeignOfficeforfundingthisstudy.Theviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthors.Contact:Dr.KatrinKaminInstitutefortheWorl
5、dEconomy(IfWKiel)Tel:04318814-283E-Mail:katrin.kaminifw-kiel.deContentsListoffigures41 Introduction-GermanysFutureForeignEconomicPolicybyGabrielFelbermayr,MarcelFratzscher,KatrinKamin&GuntramWolff52 IndustrialEconomicPerspectives132.1 TheGeopoliticsoftheGreenDealbyGeorgZachmann&MiaHoffmann(Bruegel)1
6、32.1.1 CarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism152.1.2 InternationalCarbonTrading(Article6)172.1.3 CreatingInternationalLeadMarketsTorGreenHydrogen202.1.4 PoliticalClearanceofMajorEnergyImportInfrastructure222.1.5 EnablingGreenInvestmentsinPartnerCountries242.1.6 ProductLabelingandProductCarbonRequirements26
7、2.1.7 PolicyConclusion272.2 GlobalCompetitionandIndustrialPolicyinDigitalTechnologiesbyNiclasPoitiers&PaulineWeil(Bruegel)292.2.1 HighTechnologies,bothTriggerandVictimofGeopoliticalTensions302.2.2 EUPositioningintheHighTechICTIndustry332.2.3 DigitalServicesandDigitalTrade342.2.4 PolicyConclusions363
8、 InternationalMacro-EconomicPerspectives403.1 TheInternationalRoleoftheEurobyKerstinBernoth(DIW)&PaulineWeil(Bruegel)403.1.1 MotivationsforGreaterInternationalizationoftheEuro413.1.2 MitigatingEUAmbitions433.1.3 PolicyConclusion443.2 CurrentaccountimbalancesbyKerstinBernoth(DIW)453.2.1 Accountingfor
9、GVCP473.2.2 CurrentAccountImbalancesGoodorBadforRegionalandGlobalGrowth?.483.2.3DominantCurrencyPricingandExchangeRatesasInstrumentforExternalRebalancing493.2.4 ReliabilityofBilateralCurrentAccountImbalances503.2.5 PolicyConclusions523.3 Cross-BorderPaymentswithDigitalCurrenciesbyKerstinBernoth(DIW)
10、543.3.1 RisksAssociatedwiththeRiseinPrivatelyIssuedDigitalMoney553.3.2 IsaDigitalCentralBankCurrencytheOptimalPolicyResponse?563.3.3 PolicyConclusion573.4 ChinasRoleinInternationalCreditMarketsbyMalteRieth(DIW)593.4.1 ChinasOverseasLendingBoom603.4.2 DebtSustainability,uHidden,DebtandDebtRestructuri
11、ngs653.4.3 PolicyConclusions684 InternationalTradePolicybyKatrinKamin&GabrielFelbermayr(IfW)704.3 ObjectivesandInstruments714.3.1 ObjectivesofTradePolicy714.3.2 TheBrusselsEffect734.3.3 DealingwithConflictingObjectives764.3.4 LegitimacyIssues774.3.5 TradePolicyInstruments784.3.6 Sanctions804.3.7 Tra
12、deDefenseMeasures814.3.8 VehiclesofTradePolicy824.4 TradeAgreements854.4.1 ImportantPrototypicalExistingEUTradeAgreements854.4.1.1 EU-UkraineAssociationAgreement854.4.1.2 EU-Japan864.4.1.3 EU-UK864.4.2 ExistingEUTradeAgreementsinRenegotiation874.4.2.1 EU-SwitzerIand874.4.2.2 EU-TurkeyCustomsUnion884
13、.4.3 ImportantExistingorPlannedTradeAgreementswithGeostrategicImportance904.4.3.1 TradeAgreementsofThirdParties904.4.3.2 EUTradeAgreements924.4.4 TheWorldTradeOrganization974.5 SupplyChainResilience994.5.1 RawMaterialsandCriticalInputs1014.5.2 ManagingtheRisksofDisruptions1034.5.3 SupplyChainActs105
14、4.5.4 StrategicAutonomy1064.6 PolicyConclusions1075 ConclusionbyKatrinKamin&GabrielFelbermayr(IfW)109References111Listofabbreviations124ListofFigures1US-ChinaTradeinHigh-TechGoodswithChina,2017313IntegratedCircuitshavesurpassedoilaslargestimportsbyvalue324 TheEUSelf-Surplusintheglobalcontext,bnUSD51
15、5 OversealendingofChina616 TotaldebtowedbytherestoftheworldtoChina627 Capitalflowstolow-incomecountries628ExternaldebtoftheworldowedtoChinain2017639RoutesoftheBeltanRoadInitiativeofChina6310ExternaldebtowedtoChinabycountryinpercentofGDP6611Non-tradeobjectivesinEUtradeagreementsovertime7212 Sharesing
16、lobaltradeingoodsandservices(in%)7413 NumberofRTAscurrentlyinforce,byyearofentryintoforce8414 TheEU27,stop4internationalpartnersin20199315 ShareofworldGDPcapturedbyChina,theEUandtheUS:2000,2020,and2040.9416 GATT/WTOMembershipoverTimeandTradeCovered9817 TheEffectsofGATT/WTOonEffectiveTradeCostsandRea
17、lPerCapitaIncome.10018 HowmanyproductsdotheEU27countriessourcefromhowmanycountries?.10219 Herfindahl-Hirschmannconcentrationindex1041 Introduction-Germany1SFutureForeignEconomicPolicybyGabrielFelbermayr,MarcelFratzscher,KatrinKamin&GuntramWolffTheriseofChinaasanimportantpoliticalandeconomicpowerchal
18、lengesestablishedforeignpolicypracticesinGermanyandEurope,whilethereducedappetiteoftheUnitedStates(US)tounderwritetheinternationalrules-basedsystemfurthercomplicatesthesituation.Inthepast,policymakerstendedtopursueinternationalsecurityobjectivesandinternationaleconomicgoalsseparatelyandwithdistincti
19、nstruments.Thisorthodoxyisnolongertenable.Internationaleconomictoolsandarrangements-e.g.theconditionsofaccesstodomesticmarketsandtechnologies,theuseofpaymentsystems,thenegotiationofdebtcontracts-areincreasinglyusedtoachievevariousforeignpolicygoals.Theserangefromthesanctioningofviolationsofinternati
20、onallaworuniversalhumanrightstotheprotectionofglobalcommonssuchastheclimateorbiodiversity,butaresimultaneouslyusedtopromoteownpoliticalinterests,sometimestothedetrimentofpartnercountries.This,weaponizedinterdependence,makesitnecessaryforGermanyandtheEuropeanUnion(EU)toassesstheirvulnerabilitiesandto
21、designtheirowndefensiveandoffensivestrategies.Thedifficulty,ofcourse,liesinnumeroustrade-offsthatarisewhenasingleinstrument-say,marketaccess-isusedtoachieveseveralobjectives,e.g.,economicandnon-economicones,atthesametime.ThesituationismadeworsebythecomplexEuropeangovernancestructure,inwhichsomepolic
22、iessuchassinglemarketandtradepoliciesarecentralisedunderEUcompetencewhilesecuritypoliciesremainlargelynational.Thesituationisfurthercomplicatedbythefactthatthevariouspolicygoalsareofteninterdependentandevencomplementarytoeachotherinthelongterm.Forexample,long-termgrowth,thestabilityoftheclimateandth
23、ehealthoftheglobalpopulationareinseparablyintertwined.Hence,ignoringenvironmentalconcernsintradepolicycanunderminetheconventionalgoaloffosteringgrowthandprosperity.Thisstudydescribestheobjectives,instrumentsandtrade-offs,andhowtodealwiththeminthecontextofGermanandEuropeanpolicymaking.Sometimescountr
24、ieshavepoliticalobjectivesthatputtheminconflictwithothercountries,andtheyuseeconomicpolicytoolstopromotethem.Suchconflictsareinherentlydifficulttosortout.Veryoften,however,acrossandwithincountries,thegoalsareconsensualatthemeta-level(e.g.universalhumanrights).However,thereisdissentonhowtoachievethos
25、egoals(e.g.,whetheraspecificlawonsupplychaindiligenceachievesthosegoals).Theinterdependencebetweenthemultitudeofgoalsmakesthedesignofinstrumentsandthustheachievementofthegoalsparticularlychallenging:Ontheonehand,adeparturefromsilothinkingisnecessaryCpoliticizationofeconomicsandeconomizationofpolitic
26、s,).Tradepolicy,forexample,cannotbeconductedwithoutregardtoitseffectsonclimateorhumanrights.Ontheotherhand,themixingofdiscussionspheresanddisciplinesriskscreatingdebatesthatarehardlygroundedinevidenceandwherethedebateonevidenceismixedwiththedebateongoals.Forexampleitisoftenarguedthatchangesintradepo
27、licyshouldbepursuedtoachievechangesinpoliticalregimeswhiletheevidenceoftheeffectivenessofsuchpolicyshiftsisscarce.AgainstthebackdropoftheincreasinggreatpowerrivalrybetweentheUSandChinaandtheshiftfromarules-basedtowardsamorepower-basedinternationalorder,boththeUSandChinauseeconomicpressuretoassertthe
28、irgeopoliticalinterestsagainstothercountries,includingGermanyandtheEU.Inageopoliticalenvironmentwhereamultitudeofpowerpolespursuedifferentinterestsandtheeffectivenessofinternationalandmultinationalrulesdecreases,thequestionremainshowGermanyandtheEUpositionthemselvestoaddressmountinginternationalpres
29、sureattheeconomiclevel.OneapproachoftensuggestedintheUSistoreduceeconomicinterdependenceinordertobecomelessvulnerable.WeseethisdiscussionalsotakingplaceinEuropeandGermanyinthecontextofthepandemicandthequestionwhethersupplychainsshouldbechangedandbecomemorenationalorEuropean.Thisstrategyofdecoupling”
30、,prominentintheyearsoftheTrumpAdministrationandstillpursuedbyhardliners,doesnotappeartobethecentralthrustofthecurrentUSadministration.Onthecontrary,theapproachseemstobemoretodefineconditionsandrulesforpeacefulcoexistence(CampbellandSullivan,2019).ThisapproachissimilartotheapproachoftheEU,whichin2019
31、characterizeditsstrategytowardChinaasoneofsimultaneouscooperation,competition,andsystemicrivalry. See https:/bit.ly/2UcPmvQ.ThisdiscussionisofoutstandingimportancefortheFederalRepublicofGermanyduetothegreatopennessofitseconomy.About50%ofGermantradeingoodsoccurswithcountriesoutsideoftheEU,including10
32、%withChina,7%withtheUSand4%withtheUnitedKingdom(UK).TheopennessoftheGermaneconomyisonecentralfoundationofGermanprosperity.Inrecentyears,theEUhasusedtradeagreementstosafeguardandexpandtheinterestsandopportunitiesofGermanandEuropeancompaniesinforeignmarkets.Atthesametime,ofcourse,opennessalsomeansvuln
33、erability,bothregardingopportunisticbehaviorofoutsidepowersandregardingthewell-beingofspecialsocio-economicgroupsintheEU.Thecentralthesisofthisreportisthat,togetherwithpartnersinsideandoutsideoftheEU,Germanymusttakeanactiveroleinshapinginternationaleconomicandpoliticalrelationsandthatastrategyofdeco
34、uplingordismantlinginternationallinkagesisnottoberecommended.WearguethatGermanyandtheEUrightlypromotemultilateralismasacentralpillarofthatstrategyandshouldcontinuetodoso.Intheareaoftrade,thisismostobvious:Theinternationaldivisionoflabourandtheintegrationofvaluechainshavethepotentialtogeneratestatica
35、nddynamicwelfaregainsforallparticipatingcountries,albeitpossiblyatdifferentrates.Butsuchintegrationhastohappeninaframeworkofrulesthatsetstandardsandpreventaharmfulracetothebottom.TheWorldTradeOrganisation(WTO)rulesareagoodstartingpointinthatregardandareusefullycomplementedwithbilateralandplurilatera
36、ltradedeals.TradewithoutrulesoradeglobalizationwithsignificantlylesstradewouldbothunderminethesuccessoftheGermanandEuropeaneconomicmodels.Atthesametime,withintheEuropeanframework,instrumentsmustbesharpenedtodefendandenforceinterestsinordertobelesssusceptibletoeconomicpolicypressure.Thecentralproblem
37、ofthecurrentmultilateraltradingsystemisthattheemergenceofadditionalpolesofpowertogetherwiththepartialwithdrawaloftheUShasweakeneditsstability.TheUSpole,thattraditionallyunderpinnedtheglobalsystemofrules,hasbecomelesswillingtodefendorevenrespecttherulesofthesystemithasbeeninstrumentaltocreate,aproces
38、sthat,inourview,isgoingtoendureintothefuture.ItisinthiscontextthatGermanyandtheEUneedtosharpenandstrengthendefensiveinstrumentstodeploywhentradepartnersviolateinternationalrules.Instrumentssuchastheinvestmentscreeningmechanismorthediscussedrulestoblockforeigninvestmentsincaseofexcessivesubsidization
39、serveseveralpurposes.First,theyprotecttheEU,ssinglemarketandensurefaircompetitionandalevelplayingfield.Second,suchinstrumentsservetheEUasatooltoretaliateandtodefendthesystemwheninternationalrulesarebreached.Ifswiftlyavailableandeffectiveincaseofneed,theirexistenceincreasesthestabilityoftheglobalrule
40、sbasedsystem.Ofcourse,suchdefensiveinstrumentsneedtobeemployedwithgreatcautionastheirexcessiveusewouldundermineglobalstability.Aswithallsanctions,theyexerttheirinfluence“offequilibrium);theirsheerexistence,nottheirapplication,incentivizescooperation.Third,suchtoolshaveanexplicituseindefendingclearse
41、curityinterests.Asignificantdiffcultyinthetrade-offsthatEUpolicymakersneedtoconsiderwhenweighingse-curitywitheconomicinterestsliesinthefactthatwhile,intheUnion,economicinterestsarewelldefined,securityinterestsremainlargelydefinedatthenationallevel(Leonardetal.,2019).Trade,competition,singlemarketpol
42、iciesaswellasmonetarypolicyhavebeencentralisedandaredecidedbymajorityvotingintheEU,while,securityandforeignpoliciesremainsubjecttounanimitydecisionsandarelargelyintherealmofnationaldecisionmaking.ThisstandsincontrasttotheUSandChina,wherepossibletrade-offsbetweentheseinterestscanbeweighedatthesamelev
43、el.ThisleadstoasignificantweaknessinEurope(Leonardetal.,2019).Inaworldinwhichinterdependenceinnetworksisweaponized,theissueisparticularlyacute(FarrellandNewman,2019).Overall,thechallengeistodevelopdefensiveinstrumentsbutnottofallintothetrapsofprotectionism.Infact,asargued,protectionismwouldbeamistak
44、enpolicychoice.Prominentthinkersnowrightlywarnthataprotectionisttradestrategywouldultimatelybetraytheveryinterestsofthemiddleclassitaimstoprotect(Posen,2021).Historicalevidenceevensuggeststhat,preciselybecauseofthesharpeconomiccrisisthattheworldisintheprocessofovercoming,therecouldbeanewgoldenageofg
45、lobalization(James,2021).Europealsoneedstounderstandthataccesstoitsmarketisthesinglemostimportantassetinanyofitsinternationalpolicyinteractions.Itisthereforeofparamountimportancetocontinueintegratingnationalpoliciesintoacoherent,commonframeworkinimportantpolicyareas-suchasbankingandcapitalmarketunio
46、n,strengtheningtheinternationalroleoftheeuroandcompletingthesinglemarket-inordertoprotectitseconomicinterestsinanincreasinglypolarisedworld.Moreover,Europeneedstobuildandmaintainstrategicpartnershipswithregardtoitsforeigneconomicpolicy.Inparticular,gettingChinatoopenupitsowneconomymorerapidlyandtore
47、duceexcessivestatesubsidisationthatharmscompetitionrequiresthatboththeEUandtheUSdevelopleveragevis-a-visChina.ClosereconomicpolicycooperationbetweentheEUandtheUSintheyearsaheadwillbecrucial.ItincreasestheEU,sinfluenceoverglobalstandards-fromcompetitionrules,protectionofintellectualpropertyrights,toe
48、thicalstandards,dataprotectionandstateaidrules.Eveniftrulymultilateralapproachesarepreferable,startingwithbilateralagreementsamongthetwolargesteconomiesintheworldW川beanimportantandeffectiveintermediatesteptonotonlyprotectGermanandEuropeaneconomicinterests,butalsofordefiningandimplementingtrulymultilateralsolutions.SomeformofbilateralinvestmentandtradeagreementwiththeUSshouldthereforebeoneofthetopforeignpolicyprioritiesfortheEUandforGermanyinthey
